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Abstract
Protagoras’ Grand Speech is traditionally considered to articulate a contractualist 
approach to political existence and morality. There is, however, a newly emerging line 
of interpretation among scholars, which explores a naturalist layer in Protagoras’ ethi-
cal and political thought. This article aims to make a contribution to this new way of 
reading Protagoras’ speech, by discussing one of its most elaborate versions.
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I Introduction
The myth told by Protagoras in Plato’s eponymous dialogue is traditionally 
read as intimating a contract theory of political and moral life. According to 
this contractualist reading, Protagoras assumes that political life begins with 
the establishment of certain norms for social behavior. Both the political life, 
and the ethical standards that ground it, are hence the products of a commu-
nal enterprise. In this reading, the gifts of Zeus represent a turn from a pre-
political life to a life in poleis.
Michel Narcy (1990 and 2008) provides a thoroughly contractualist interpre-
tation of Protagoras’ position. Narcy takes very straightforwardly Protagoras’ 
announcement, at 320c, of equivalence between the myth and the logos laid 
out in the second part of his Grand Speech. According to Narcy, Protagoras’ 
logos contains nothing that was not already stated (allegorically) in the myth. 
Consequently, Narcy claims, the prose equivalent of the mythical Zeus is noth-
ing other than the polis as a social organism. That is, the order established by 
 47The Myth of Protagoras
méthexis 29 (2017) 46-58
<UN>
Zeus’ command to Hermes corresponds to the polis, and the universal endow-
ment of human beings with ‘shame and a sense of right’ is equivalent to what 
a polis provides for its citizens. It corresponds to the universal care given by 
society to the moral education of its members, from children to the highest 
magistrates. Accordingly, the joint aim of the Protagorean myth and the logos 
would be to prove a “social essence” for morality. For Narcy, Protagoras reduces 
morality to “civility” in two reciprocal ways: not only does the polis prescribe 
moral norms for its members and endow them with moral notions to render 
them moral agents; but also it is the following of these norms that makes a 
polis.1 Moreover, Narcy thinks that for Protagoras, language is the only art avail-
able for our education in morality. It is this art, which can only be taught by 
society, that makes us moral beings, and education in virtue is thus nothing 
but ‘saying’ right from wrong. The art of speaking is therefore the political and 
moral art par excellence.2
One serious problem with such a contractualist approach is its circularity. 
According to this line of interpretation, it is moral education, on the one hand, 
which makes the poleis possible, but on the other hand, such an education can 
be secured only by the poleis.
II A Recent Naturalist Reading of the Myth
Recently, an alternative naturalistic interpretation of Protagoras’ myth has 
emerged. This approach remains underdeveloped and has not yet gained wide 
acceptance among scholars.3 A recent article by Adam Beresford (2013), how-
ever, provides a highly elaborate version of this nascent naturalistic reading.4 
According to Beresford, Protagoras views morality as a part of human nature, 
1 See especially Narcy (1990, p. 44).
2 Narcy (1990, pp. 44–45).
3 See Nussbaum (2001, p. 102–103), Vegetti (2004) and Bonazzi (2012). See also Van Riel (2012) 
on the naturalness of religion according to the myth.
4 In contemporary philosophy, the term “ethical naturalism” is used to designate a doctrine 
about the status of moral properties and facts, namely, the doctrine that there are moral 
properties and facts which are natural. However, here I use it to label the idea which refers 
the origins of morality and ethical behaviour to human nature. I use it in this sense because 
Beresford seems to do so. Although this use of the term is somewhat alien to its contempo-
rary usage, I think it is correct in the present context since it corresponds fairly well to the 
question at stake in the ancient nomos/physis debate, which is the question of the origins 
and legitimacy of moral and political norms.
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and Zeus’ gifts stand for a natural endowment: Zeus’ command to Hermes 
allegorically represents the fact that ethical dispositions are not products 
of nomos, but rather belong to our nature at the most basic level. They are 
the foundations upon which we subsequently construct our education in vir-
tue. When Protagoras affirms that ethical virtues do not arise in us by nature 
(323c5), all by themselves, he would thereby not mean that they have no basis 
in our nature. On the contrary, human nature, according to Protagoras, would 
have an ‘unreflective grasp of the basic moral facts’ and ‘innate normative ten-
dencies of the right kind’. These innate dispositions would be doing a major 
part of the work upon which moral education depends. Moral education is 
simply a ‘blunt’ instrument which ‘triggers’ our potential for morally right be-
havior. In Protagoras’ account, it is hence not culture but nature that makes us 
moral beings; culture merely triggers our moral nature to be what it already 
potentially is.
Beresford thinks that this interpretation adequately captures the meaning 
of the myth because it is consistent with the general principle of the allegory 
of ‘divine gifts’. There is a parallel between Zeus’ gifts and Epimetheus’ endow-
ment of other animals with certain traits, insofar as both aim at promoting the 
survival of the living beings in question. The mythical notion of divine gifts 
generally functions according to this principle. Such gifts represent features 
of animal nature that prevent the extinction of the animal kind. As the story 
goes, Zeus also intervenes to promote the survival of human beings and hence 
gives us the gifts of dikê and aidôs. According to the general rationale of divine 
gifts in the myth, Zeus’ gifts would stand for a normative instinct for the right 
kind of behavior, and morality would be a tool for human survival. Beresford 
concludes that ‘we should see in the story an outline of the idea that our in-
clination towards fairness is a natural endowment, a characteristic of species 
[…] What Protagoras means, on this reading, […] is not that we ever figured 
out its value ourselves, or “internalized” it by some essentially cultural process. 
In the same way, a bear’s sharp and powerful teeth came into being because 
they enabled it to perpetuate its kind, but the bear never had any thoughts at 
all about that fact, and did not need to, because, fortunately for the bear, it was 
not responsible for designing its own teeth.’5
Beresford’s naturalist interpretation of Protagoras’ myth seems to be based 
on the following three assumptions: Firstly, our natural morality consists in 
dispositions of the right kind. Secondly, natural morality is basically a poten-
tial for the right kind of behavior; it is waiting to be activated (‘triggered’) by 
5 Beresford (2013, p. 158 – italics in the original).
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cultural processes. And thirdly, Beresford claims that the myth is more an al-
legory for the historical origins of humanity and civilization than for the actual 
state of affairs described in the second part of Protagoras’ speech.
Now, if Protagoras is really the author of a treatise titled On the Origi-
nal Condition of Humankind (Peri tês en archê katastaseôs – D.L., IX, 55), the 
myth in the Protagoras can certainly be expected to contain allusions to this 
work. Nevertheless, this is not the function that Protagoras assigns to the 
myth in his speech. He definitely wants it to be an allegory for what he is go-
ing to demonstrate in the later part of his speech (320c). One problem with 
Beresford’s reading is, therefore, that taking the myth to be an allegory for 
the original human condition unbalances its announced symmetry with the 
logos. If Zeus’ gifts stand for our natural moral instincts, which are to be ‘trig-
gered’ by a cultural intervention (so as to enable us to survive), then what is 
the mythical counterpart of the polis and the universal education it is said to 
be providing in the logos? What is the mythical equivalent of the triggering 
mechanism? There seems to be a missing mythical element in Beresford’s 
interpretation. Narcy’s analyses of the symmetry between the myth and the 
logos therefore seem to be stronger than Beresford’s. For Narcy, Zeus’ inter-
vention stands for the active and continuous education the polis provides to 
its citizens.6
A mere problem of symmetry would not be worth mentioning. Yet this par-
ticular problem of symmetry indicates that, in Beresford’s interpretation, mor-
al activity is being sought at the wrong time: according to the myth, it would 
seem that human beings are morally active long before Zeus’ intervention. 
I shall further elaborate this point later on in the paper.
Another problem with Beresford’s interpretation is that Zeus seems to want 
the distribution of his gifts to be imbued with the universality of a command, 
rather than with the universality of a natural endowment. Zeus seriously con-
siders the possibility that there might be individuals who choose not to comply 
with the code of his gifts (322d). Therefore, compliance with dikê and aidôs 
seems not to be a natural endowment, which binds each member of the spe-
cies more or less equally and spontaneously, but rather a command from Zeus, 
which human beings had better not refuse. Those who do so will be viewed 
as social pests and subjected to the ultimate punishment. Zeus’ gifts are thus 
6 According to Claude Calame (2012, p. 137), the pragmatic effect of Protagoras’ story consists 
in accounting for and legitimizing the present. Cynthia Farrar also thinks that ‘Protagoras’ 
story is not a naturalistic account of the rise of human society. Protagoras was interested not 
in how the world came to be, but in how it was. His account of the development of human 
society is analytic, not genetic.’ (1988, p. 88).
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not intended to be universal natural endowments,7  which possess a value that 
could never be figured out by humans.8 On the contrary, human beings are 
supposed to appreciate this value.
This last point shows that Beresford’s second assumption, namely that 
natural morality is basically a potential for the right kind of behavior, is also 
problematic. Human morality is not polarized as ‘Either virtue or no moral-
ity!’ Beresford’s second assumption leads him to identify ‘morality’ with ‘be-
ing virtuous’.9 However, the possibility that some individuals might fail to 
comply with Zeus’ code suggests that in its potential form, morality does not 
necessarily consists in the ‘right’ kinds of dispositions. Consequently, active or 
‘triggered’ morality does not necessarily consist in virtuous activity. Failing to 
comply with Zeus’ code (and thus behaving inhumanely) remains an option 
for human beings. Even if we accept that human beings naturally possess the 
potential for the right kind of behaviour, the fact that certain individuals do 
not respond to the ‘triggering’ mechanism (education) does not render them 
amoral or morally inactive.10 This indicates that our natural morality does not 
merely consist in dispositions of the kind encoded by Zeus, and that there is 
hence a need for education and punishment. This is exactly the point that Pro-
tagoras is trying to make in his speech, against Socrates’ claim that virtue can-
not be taught.
Finally, Beresford’s analyses commit him to a circularity not dissimilar to 
that found in the contractualist reading. If the poleis cannot exist without ac-
tive virtue, and education is the necessary precondition for the emergence 
7 Pace C. C. W. Taylor (1976, p. 88) who finds it likely that at 323a2–3, ‘Protagoras fails to 
distinguish between the propositions (a) civilized life requires that everyone be required 
to be good (i.e. be subject to penalties if he fails etc.), and (b) civilized life requires that ev-
eryone be good. (a) is, arguably true, (b) obviously false. If that is so, then Protagoras will 
have failed to distinguish a universal normative requirement from a universal factual one.’ 
See also Michael Nill’s (1985, p. 9) suggestions to reconcile this seeming inconsistency in 
Protagoras’ views.
8 For a similar interpretation, see also Bernd Manuwald (2013, p. 175).
9 A natural potential for the right kind of moral behavior implies an innate knowledge of 
the good and the bad as such. However, this view would be inconsistent with Protagorean 
relativism in ethics. For an interesting discussion of this question, see Eric Brown (2009). 
I discuss Protagorean views in the Theaetetus below.
10 In the post-Grand Speech discussion on the unity of virtues, at 329e and 349d, Protagoras 
considers the possibility that one can have the virtue of courage but not that of justice. 
This supports my point that his story does not mean Zeus’ gifts to be universal natural 
endowments. On this point see also Nill (1985, pp. 8 – 9).
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of true and complete virtue, then neither true virtue nor the poleis can ever 
emerge. This perspective commits Beresford to the same position regarding 
the question of political existence as that taken by the contractualist. Al-
though he makes no explicit statement of this point, the logic of his analyses 
makes political existence into an artifact. From his perspective, political 
activity would be impossible for human beings prior to the triggering of 
their innate normative dispositions. This results in another circularity: it takes 
a polis for humans to be political, and to thereby gain the capacity to found a 
polis.
III An Alternative Naturalist Reading of the Myth
I believe that the Protagoras myth depends on naturalistic assumptions about 
both morality and political existence, but that they are of a different kind than 
Beresford suggests.11 Beresford seeks human moral activity at the wrong time 
because, according to the myth, human beings are morally and politically ac-
tive long before Zeus’ gifts. Translated into the language of the logos, Protago-
ras assumes that human beings are morally and politically active prior to the 
existence of any polis. One’s moral and political existence would thus not de-
pend upon the polis. I take this last point to be the principal anthropological 
assumption upon which Protagoras’ account (his logos) of the present political 
state in Athens rests.
In the myth, almost none of the features traditionally considered to be ex-
clusively human figures among the gifts from the gods. Reason, language and 
the perception of the good and the bad (the just and the unjust) are not giv-
en by any god. Language was developed by human beings after Prometheus 
gave them fire. By contrast, the capacity for reason is assumed to be present 
in humans even before Epimetheus’ clumsy distribution of natural faculties: 
‘Epimetheus, not being altogether wise, didn’t notice that he had used up all 
the powers on the non-rational creatures; so last of all he was left with human 
kind, quite unprovided for’ (321c).12 The human race is unequipped except for 
its reason, and the difference between the reasoning and the unreasoning ani-
mals thus predates Epimetheus’ work.
11 The naturalist views that I attribute to Protagoras do not necessarily belong to the histori-
cal figure himself. I rather take them to belong to the Protagoras represented by Plato in 
his eponymous dialogue.
12 Translation by C.C.W. Taylor (1976).
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Prometheus’ theft, from Hephaestos and Athena, of fire and practical 
wisdom in order to give them to human beings, presupposed that humans 
were already capable, not only of receiving and understanding this technical 
knowledge, but also of actively using it for survival. The fact that human be-
ings survived because they could use their reason technikôs proves that they 
were capable of using it correctly, at least with respect to survival. Prior to 
Prometheus’ gifts, human beings therefore already had the nature required to 
become wise in the practical arts. What Prometheus gave to the human race 
was not reason as such, but rather a particular virtue of it. His gift made hu-
man beings capable of using technikôs their pre-existing natural capacity for 
reason.13
Zeus’ gifts can be seen in a similar light. Protagoras says that ‘since man 
shared in a divine gift, he was the only creature to worship the gods, with 
whom they had a kind of kinship, and erected altars and sacred images of the 
gods’ (322a).14 It follows that human beings were religious before Zeus’ inter-
vention. However, this chronology of religion also indicates that, before they 
received dikê and aidôs from Zeus’ hands, human beings were already capable 
of discerning the gods’ apportionment, recognizing that the gods deserved re-
spect and that humans owed respect to the gods in return for their enjoyment 
of divine gifts. Human beings, therefore, already possessed some sense of fair-
ness, and were already capable of correctly discerning the just from the unjust 
(at least in the domain of religious affairs).
Moreover, it is said that human beings failed in their first attempts to found 
cities in order to survive animal attacks, because ‘they wronged each other 
13 One might question the likelihood of the thesis that the human capacity for reason is 
presupposed in the myth, and object that Protagoras does not really need to make an 
assumption about what enables humans to gain the arts other than their own doing: 
anything humans become in the myth, they become by their own effort. (I owe this 
observation to Ronald Polansky.) The problem with this objection is that to make sense 
of it we need to presuppose reason. The content of the effort that humans exhibit in or-
der to overcome their problems of survival and the solutions they figure out cannot be 
explained without reference to one or another form of rationality. The myth is designed 
to construe the current human condition and “reason” is presupposed so that the story 
will make better sense. Besides, in his Prometheus Bound (440–445), [Pseudo-] Aeschy-
lus too takes the capacity for reason as a given in humans. What his Prometheus does 
is help humans “achieve” their already-present rational capacities. I suspect that taking 
reason as a given element of the human nature is a traditional motif in the Prometheus 
stories.
14 Taylor’s (1976) translation modified.
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(êdikoun allêlous)’ (322b).15 Humans’ refusing to band together because of the 
wrongs they suffered from each other indicates that they did indeed already 
possess a certain sense of justice. Even before they receive the virtue of justice 
(dikaiosunê), human beings perceive what is good and what is bad for them-
selves. They make a judgment (whether correct or not) and form an opinion 
(whether correct or not) regarding what they deserve, and they apparently 
expect some respect and temperance (aidôs or sophrosunê) from the others. 
Human beings hence always have an opinion about questions of justice, and 
in some cases (as that of the gods) they make correct judgements. As with Pro-
metheus’ gift of wisdom in practical sciences, what Zeus gave to the human be-
ings is not the sense of justice as such but rather the virtue for it. Prior to Zeus’ 
gifts, human beings already possessed a natural perceptiveness to questions of 
justice. Zeus granted them the virtues most intimately related to questions 
of justice, thus enabling them to resolve the fundamental problems that they 
faced whenever they tried to band together.
IV Protagoras’ Political Naturalism
This brings me to my point about Protagoras’ political naturalism. According 
to the myth, human beings were politically active before their reception of po-
litical virtues. Although they failed several times, they repeatedly attempted 
to found cities and unite in a communal enterprise. It follows that before they 
become capable of founding and safely governing their cities, human be-
ings already knew how to act politically; they just did not know how to do it 
technikôs, for this requires technê politikê, which is precisely what Protagoras 
claims to be teaching. Besides, Hermes’ question (322c) attests to the fact that 
there already existed a certain division of labor before Zeus’ intervention, i.e., 
before the foundation of the poleis. Therefore, political existence in the myth 
precedes political organization. As political organization can only be the work 
of a political being, this makes perfect sense. This interpretation avoids the 
circularity of both contractualism and Beresford’s naturalism.
Although I do not claim that the myth and the logos are intended to prove 
the naturalness of political life for human beings, I do believe that both are 
based on this assumption. Zeus’ enterprise is clearly based on it. Firstly, Zeus 
could have come up with an altogether different solution. He could have said: 
‘These human beings cannot succeed in political life; let’s give them a different 
15 Taylor (1976) translates: ‘They treated each other with injustice’ (italics added).
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mode of life, one in which they can get along, a simpler one!’ But he did not. 
His solution to the problems of humanity presupposes, rather than creates, 
our political existence.16 Contrary to the contractualist interpretation, human 
beings do not become political through their education in social and politi-
cal virtues. As political animals, they require such an education, and Zeus re-
sponds to that need. Zeus’ gifts make sense only insofar as human beings are 
political animals, who experience political problems that require for their so-
lution the gifts of dikê and aidôs.17
Secondly, in the myth, the survival of non-human animal species is guar-
anteed by securing the survival of the individuals within that species. 
However, individuals who do not comply with Zeus’ code are not condemned 
to extinction in a process of natural selection as a result of their natural defi-
ciencies. Rather, they are subject to punishment in accordance with an estab-
lished code, which can be transgressed since it is not a law of nature. After all, 
the section in Zeus’ command concerning transgressors does not state: ‘Let 
their race slowly become extinct, one by one and in misery!’ These individuals 
are considered to be a pestilence, not to themselves, but to society. Although 
Zeus wants his command to be universally binding, the qualities that the com-
plying individuals will acquire are not meant to enable them to survive indi-
vidually. Such qualities guarantee individual survival only through the survival 
of the society to which the individual belongs. These considerations support 
16 For a similar line of argument see Nussbaum (2001, p. 102–103). Mauro Bonazzi (2012) 
defends a version of this view. Although I don’t share his idea that according to Protag-
oras political existence for human beings consists in the possession and realization of 
aidôs and dikê Mauro Bonazzi’s interpretation of Protagoras’ view on the naturalness of 
political existence is worth mentioning here. Bonazzi thinks that Protagoras’ aim in the 
myth is not to give a history of the development of human civilization. His aim is rather 
to circumscribe some anthropological facts about human beings. Accordingly, the myth 
has to be divided into two parts as before and after Zeus’ intervention. For Bonazzi, the 
first part of the myth is intended to show, in a counterfactual way, what human beings 
are: they are political beings, and without a well-established political order, it is impos-
sible for them to exist. Read this way, the myth intimates Protagoras’ basic assumption 
about the priority of political existence for human beings. According to Bonazzi, ‘la di-
mensione politica non è una conquista posteriore che conclude il cammino dell'umanità, 
ma è la condizione di possibilità della vita umana, degli uomini in quanto uomini.’ (2012, 
p. 47).
17 Mario Vegetti (2004) shares a similar view on this point. According to him, the myth of 
Protagoras takes pleonexia and adikia as anthropological constants, which are not com-
pletely irrecoverable. According to him, both parts of Protagoras’ speech (that is, the myth 
and the logos) underlines the need to control these two vices by law and education, in 
order to promote the natural propensity of man for cooperation in the polis.
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the conclusion that Zeus’ actions presuppose the political nature of human 
beings.
V Protagoras in Other Dialogues
The foregoing interpretation gives a coherent picture of Protagoras as he is rep-
resented in Plato’s works. In the Theaetetus, Socrates attributes to Protagoras 
the idea that a wise politician replaces pernicious social conventions with ben-
eficial ones, by making them appear just to the city (166e–167d). Wisdom in 
politics thus consists in promulgating laws that change the life of a city and its 
citizens for the better. This idea supposes that the search for what is beneficial 
and advantageous for human life requires some knowledge of what is better for 
humans. The example of sick plants and the gardener, at 167b–c, suggests that 
what is meant by ‘wisdom’ here is some knowledge of an objective truth about 
what is advantageous to an organism.18 Therefore, according to the Protagoras 
of the Theaetetus, although the content of law and morality diverges from polis 
to polis by convention, their existence targets a natural good, namely, a bet-
ter state of being. For Protagoras, the fact that there is no necessary objective 
relation between what is just and what is beneficial for human beings calls 
for wisdom in the domain of politics: political wisdom aims at a ‘wholesome’ 
adjustment between these two. People make different judgements about what 
is just; and it takes education, virtue, and political action to turn that which 
promotes human well-being into law.
The thesis attributed to Protagoras in the Theaetetus is, therefore, in confor-
mity with the assumptions of the myth. In the latter, humans are represented 
as having a certain natural sense of justice, without, however, being naturally 
capable of using it virtuously. Virtue in justice requires education. In the The-
aetetus, as one consequence of his relativist position regarding justice, Pro-
tagoras is represented as stating that ‘for each person and each city, things are 
what they seem to them to be’ (168b). This is supposed to mean that each per-
son and each city does have a judgement, i.e. a judgement of some sort, about 
justice; but being wise about that judgment is something different and requires 
an eye for what is useful and beneficial.
Besides Theaetetus, it is commonplace among scholars to consider the so-
cial contract theory formulated by Glaucon at Republic II (358e–361d) as a ref-
erence to Protagoras. This is a hasty judgment and also inaccurate, because this 
18 This is how Kerferd (1949) understands Protagoras’ idea that an expert improves his 
subject.
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theory has a conspicuous Calliclean aspect that Protagoras’ naturalism does 
not possess. The contract theory as it is construed by Glaucon is established 
not only on the principle that suffering injustice is bad but also on the idea 
that doing injustice is naturally good (358e3). The natural goodness of doing 
injustice is, in fact, the substance of the story about the ancestor of Gyges of 
Lydia. In the social contract account of morality as propounded by Glaucon, 
people establish a norm of justice despite their belief in the natural goodness 
of doing injustice. This aspect is completely alien to Protagoras’ approach in all 
interpretations of it.
Plato seems to have a more or less well-framed picture of Protagoras’ ethical 
and political naturalism, which allows him to distinguish it from other theo-
ries current in the same period. This picture is, however, in conflict with both 
Beresford’s and Narcy’s interpretations of Protagoras. In Plato, the Protagorean 
assumptions about the origins of morally right behavior do not refer it to hu-
man nature. Just like Zeus’ ‘moral intervention’ with an eye to human survival 
in the Protagoras, the Protagoras of the Theaetetus also assumes that morally 
right dispositions and behaviors vis-à-vis justice are the ones which benefit hu-
man nature. But people may fail (and do ordinarily fail) to discern them (this 
was also Zeus’ diagnosis about the post-Promethean humanity). They need to 
be educated and led into them. Being wise and being in a good state vis-à-vis 
justice is not a question of “triggering” an already existing natural disposition 
for just behavior. The right disposition about justice is to be acquired. However, 
this last point does not support Narcy’s contractualist interpretation either be-
cause, in this Protagorean picture, education in morally right behavior does 
not consist in turning amoral beings into moral ones. Human morality as such 
is not a social invention, only morally right behavior is.
VI Conclusion
Contrary to Beresford’s interpretation, Zeus’ gifts do not stand for anything 
natural. They do, however, undoubtedly assume something natural i.e., the 
naturalness of human political existence and morality. Zeus’ gifts make better 
sense on this reading: If humans were not moral and political animals, prob-
lems between neighbors would not necessitate an ethical code for social be-
havior as their best solution.
However, Protagoras’ position does not exclude the idea of a social contract 
altogether. He seems to simultaneously endorse both a naturalist and a con-
tractualist position in the sense that his contractualism is based on certain nat-
uralist assumptions. According to Protagoras, humans are naturally perceptive 
 57The Myth of Protagoras
méthexis 29 (2017) 46-58
<UN>
about questions of justice and hence have a natural tendency to make judge-
ments about justice – which does not mean that they always make virtuous 
judgements. This is why Zeus establishes a moral code for social behavior. If we 
were to translate this claim into the language of Protagoras’ logos, we could say 
that humans figured out the value of political virtues and co-operation for them-
selves, and developed norms and laws to this end.19 If they appreciate the value 
of the divine gift secured by Prometheus, they will also appreciate the value of 
a moral and social code that promotes their survival.
As sketched here, Protagoras can be considered a precursor of Aristotle’s 
naturalism, according to which humans are political animals by nature. Like 
Protagoras, Aristotle also assumes that humans possess a perception of the 
just and the unjust.20 However, one crucial difference remains between the 
two thinkers: unlike Aristotle, Protagoras’ naturalism is not eudaemonist.21 His 
stance on the naturalness of political and moral life for human beings does not 
take the form of an ethical reflection upon the telos of human life as such. Not 
only in comparison to Callicles, but in comparison to Aristotle too, Protagoras’ 
naturalism does not have any determinate normative content. If it is true, as 
Gregory Vlastos has suggested, that eudaemonism22 becomes foundational for 
virtually everyone after Socrates, then Protagorean naturalism is a pre-Socratic 
position in this specific sense too.
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